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Abstract
We consider a two-stage elimination contest where before the com-
petition in the second round takes place contestants' abilities are re-
vealed. We derive a monotonic symmetric equilibrium and make a
comparison of the expected e®ort with and without revelation of abil-
ity. Our main ¯nding is that the revelation always increases the ¯rst-
round e®ort but decreases the second-round e®ort. As our numerical
examples show, the expected two-round total e®ort can, however, ei-
ther increase or decrease with the revelation.
Keywords: Contests; Tournaments; Complete information; Incomplete
information.
JEL classi¯cation: C73; D82; M51
1 Introduction
Contests or tournaments as a form of competition are prevalent in many
social and economic settings. On the ¯elds or in the stadiums, virtually all
competitions are tournaments. Promotions within ¯rms, elections, patent
races, and many political campaigns can also be understood as contests of
one form or another. Early literature on tournaments focuses on the ratio-
nales behind using them as a contractual arrangement and compare them
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1with optimal contracts (e.g., Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Green and Stokey,
1983; Nalebu® and Stiglitz, 1983). More recently, researchers, perhaps in-
°uenced by the mechanism design approach, have shifted their attention
to optimal contest designs (e.g., Gradstein and Konrad, 1999; Moldovanu
and Sela, 2001, 2006; Matros, 2005). This more recent literature tackles is-
sues such as the optimal prize structures and the optimal way of organizing
contestants into rounds and sub-contests.
This paper considers another important aspect of contest design that is
relevant to many contests in practice: whether it is optimal in a sequential
contest to reveal information about contestants' abilities. Many sport com-
petitions as well as career advancements in organizations are organized as
sequential contests. In many instances of these competitions, the natural
environment of the contests inevitably render contestants' abilities a public
knowledge. For example, it is a common practice in sport tournaments that
all matches are recorded by the coaches as a part of the preparation. As a
result, teams are well informed of their rivals' abilities. In organizations, ef-
fort exerted by employees in the initial stage of their career typically reveals
their abilities. When a group of employees are subsequently selected for a
promotion and enter into another round of competition for higher places in
the hierarchy, they would therefore have a pretty good idea of how capable
their colleagues are. Note, however, that even though abilities are revealed
in these later rounds of competition so that every contestant knows that
the strongest member has a competitive edge over all others, the strongest
member still has to exert e®ort because ¯rms require individual performance
at all levels in order to operate and audience expects the teams to perform
in sport events. This observation will be captured as an important feature
of our model.
It should be noted that we are not dealing with a general mechanism
design problem in which the designer's objective is to maximize some e®ort
parameters. Rather, we concentrate on the question of how, in a multi-
round elimination contest, revelation of abilities a®ects the e®ort exerted by
the contestants. We adopt the two-stage elimination contest of Moldovanu
and Sela (2006) as a platform to study the e®ects of ability revelation. The
ability parameters are private information in the initial round that are nev-
ertheless fully revealed before the second-round, and this changes the in-
formation environment facing the advancing contestants.1 The contestants
1There are many di®erent kinds of feedback policies. One can easily think of, for exam-
ple, full revelation or partial revelation with some statistics such as the mean or median
2fully anticipate this, and that fact, in turn, a®ects their e®ort level not only
in the last rounds but also in the ¯rst round.2 Thus, the ¯rst-round contest
is equivalent to an all-pay auction with incomplete information while the
second-round contest an all-pay auction with complete information.
We derive a monotonic symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of this
contest. Then, we compare contests with and without ability revelation.
Our result indicates that the ¯rst-round total e®ort is always higher with
ability revelation while the second-round total e®ort is always lower. Two
numerical examples demonstrate that the expected two-round total e®ort
can be either higher or lower with ability revelation.
The exposition of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes
the design of the contest. Section 3 contains the derivation of the monotonic
symmetric equilibrium of the two-stage contest with ability revelation. For
comparison, we also reproduce the equilibrium of the contest without ability
revelation in Moldovanu and Sela (2006). A thorough comparison of the two
contests is made in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains
the order-statistical tools that are used in the paper. All the proofs are in
Appendix B.
2 The Design of the Contest
The two-stage elimination contest is organized as follows. There are n risk-
neutral contestants, equally divided into t groups each with k = n=t mem-
bers. In the ¯rst round of the contest, each contestant competes with his
k ¡ 1 rivals within the group. In each of these t sub-contests, a winner is
singled out to receive one of the t runner-up prizes W1, and the remaining
k ¡ 1 participants will be eliminated. However, the potential award from
winning in the ¯rst round is more than W1; a ¯rst-round winner has the
ability. This paper considers a full ability revelation where abilities of all contestants are
revealed after the ¯rst round. This is an extreme kind of ability revelation. However, as we
argued, the natural design of many contests provides this information to the contestants.
The full revelation we focus on is therefore not an artifact but a common feature of many
sequential contests in practice.
2While we only consider a two-stage contest, the change of the information structure
after an ability revelation allows us to apply backward induction to the subsequent rounds
of a contest with more than two rounds. To study the e®ect of the ability revelation, we
therefore restrict our analysis to two-stage contests.
3opportunity to compete in the second round for a main prize of W2. Figure
1 provides a visual depiction of the contest structure.
Figure 1: Contest Structure
Contestant i competes with his rivals by exerting costly e®ort at a con-
stant marginal cost of ci where ci is his private information. The competition
technology is deterministic: suppose xi denotes the e®ort exerted by contes-
tant i, then i wins a contest if and only if xi > xj for all j 6= i contestants
in his group. In the case of a tie, a prize is assigned with equal probability
among winners. Note that no matter winning or losing, the e®ort exerted is
sunk.3 The cost of e®ort can be interpreted as the ability of a contestant.
A contestant with high ability is the one with low marginal cost, and vice
versa. We use high (low) ability and low (high) cost interchangeably to de-
scribe the strength of a contestant. Each contestant's cost is independently
drawn from the common distribution F with a continuous density f,4 and
3Therefore, the contest is equivalent to an all-pay auction in which the bidder with the
highest bid wins but all bidders, winning or losing, have to pay their bids.
4Since most distribution functions we shall use for deriving results are distributions of
4the support is [m;1] where m > 0.5 The distribution function F is assumed
to be common knowledge. We use capital letter C to denote the random
variable of contestants' cost of e®ort. Then, in our notations described in
Appendix A, C(k;n), k = 1;2;:::;n, denotes the corresponding order statis-
tics of C, where C(1;n) is the random variable of the lowest cost among n
contestants, C(2;n) is the random variable of the second lowest cost, and so
on.
The novel feature of our model is that, after the ¯rst-round winners
are determined, individual abilities are publicly revealed before the second-
round contest takes place.6
The exact timing of the game is as follows:
1. Contestants are divided into t groups in the ¯rst round with k = n=t
contestants in each group.
2. Nature draws a cost of e®ort, c, for each contestant from the distri-
bution F. Each contestant knows his value of c and only that other
contestant's costs are independently distributed according to F.
3. In each of the t sub-contests, contestants compete with k¡1 rivals for
the prize W1 and the opportunity to enter the second round.
4. The t winners in the ¯rst round are determined and awarded the
runner-up prizes W1. They observe the abilities of each other.
5. Given the ¯nalists' abilities, the t contestants decide how much e®ort
to exert in the second round.
6. The prize W2 is awarded to the ¯nal winner.
order-statistics, to ease the description we shall call F the primitive distribution. More
generally, primitive distribution will be used to denote any distribution of unranked ran-
dom variables. Refer to Appendix A for the details of their relations.
5m is assumed to be strictly positive to avoid in¯nite e®ort when cost is zero.
6Since only the ¯rst-round winners are going to compete in the second round, it makes
no di®erence whether the abilities of all n contestants or just the t ¯rst-round winners are
revealed.
53 Equilibrium Analysis of the Contest
In this section, we analyze the monotonic symmetric equilibrium of the two-
stage contest. To expedite the comparison with the contest without ability
revelation, we also reproduce some results from Moldovanu and Sela (2006).
3.1 Ability Revelation
The approach of our equilibrium analysis is a constructive one. We derive
the expected value of the second-round participation as a part of the ¯rst-
round prize based on the conjecture that there exists a monotonic symmetric
equilibrium. Then, we derive the ¯rst-round equilibrium e®ort function and
verify that the equilibrium we obtain is indeed monotonic. The equilibrium
we derive is a unique monotonic symmetric equilibrium.
Second-Round E®ort
The second-round contest is a game of complete information and the analysis
of such a contest in Hillman and Riley (1989) can be used to derive the
equilibrium.
Denote yi to be the e®ort exerted by contestant i in the second round.









1; if yi > yj for all j 6= i;
0; if yi < yj for at least one j 6= i;
1=jmaxfy1;:::;ytgj; if yi 2 maxfy1;:::;ytg;
where j:::j stands for the cardinality of a set. Hillman and Riley (1989) show
that in an equilibrium only the two contestants with highest abilities partic-
ipate in the competition, and they both adopt mixed strategies.7 This gives
7Baye et al. (1996) consider the same strategic environment in the setting of all-pay
6the following characterization of our second-round e®ort spending: After the
ability revelation, only the two highest-ability (lowest-cost) ¯nalists partici-
pate while the remaining contestants stay out of the competition. Formally,
Lemma 1. In the second round ¯nalist 1 with cost c1 and ¯nalist 2 with
cost c2 such that c1 < c2 < cj, for all j 6= 1;2, randomize their e®ort with
distribution functions B1(y) and B2(y) respectively, where
B1(y) =
(
(c2=W2)y; for 0 · y < W2=c2;







1 ¡ c1=c2; for y = 0;
(1 ¡ c1=c2) + (c1=W2)y; for 0 < y < W2=c2;
1; for y ¸ W2=c2:
(2)
All other participants j 6= 1;2, exert zero e®ort.
We refer to Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye et al. (1996) for the
details of the proof.
Note that the expected equilibrium payo®s of ¯nalists 1 and 2 are re-
spectively W2(1 ¡ c1=c2) and zero. As such, in the second-round only the
highest-ability contestant has a positive expected payo®. The expected pay-
o®s of all other ¯nalists are zero.
First-Round E®ort
There are e®ectively two prizes for the ¯rst-round winners: each winner is
awarded W1 and the opportunity to participate in the second round where
he stands some chance to win W2. How much a contestant values the later
depends on his expected payo® from the second round. These two prizes
enter into the maximization problem of a contestant as the revenue side of
auctions and ¯nd other asymmetric equilibria. In this paper, we focus on the equilibrium
described in Hillman and Riley (1989).
7his expected payo® when he decides how much e®ort to exert in the ¯rst
round. While W1 is exogenously given, the value of another prize - the \entry
ticket" to the second round - depends on the ability of the contestant. We
show above that in the second round only the highest-ability contestant has




W2(1 ¡ ci=c2); if ci < cj for all j 6= i;
0; if ci > cj for at least one j 6= i;
(3)
where c2 is any realized value of the cost of the second highest-ability con-
testant in the second round.
In the ¯rst round when a contestant evaluates the value of the second-
round participation, he takes into account the likelihood of winning in the
second round as well as the expected value of ¼ (conditioned on winning).
Note also that the relevant distribution in the second round with respect
to which the expectation is taken is F(1;k), the distribution of the costs of
t ¯nalists who beat their rivals in the sub-contests of k contestants. Sta-
tistically, F(1;k) is just the distribution of the ¯rst-order statistics among k
random variables, and it becomes the primitive distribution of the second-
round contest. For convenience, we denote G = F(1;k).
Given (3) the expected value of the second-round participation, ¦,is
given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The expected value of the second-round participation to a










where G(1;t¡1) is the distribution of the ¯rst order-statistics among t ¡ 1
random variables with the primitive distribution G = F(1;k).
Expression (4) substantiates formally our preceding discussion that the
expected value of the second-round participation depends on individual's






dG(1;t¡1)(s) < 0: (5)
This means that the expected value of the second-round \entry ticket" is
higher for contestants with higher ability (or lower cost).
Note that if there exists a strictly monotonic symmetric equilibrium, a
contestant who exerts the highest e®ort in the ¯rst round in the equilibrium
is also the one with the highest ability.
To proceed, we assume that contestants j 6= i follow a symmetric, de-
creasing, and di®erentiable equilibrium strategy xj(cj) in the ¯rst round.
Suppose that contestant i receives a cost xi and exerts e®ort ~ xi. We wish
to determine the optimal ~ xi. If contestant i exerts e®ort ~ xi, his probability
of winning the ¯rst-round sub-contest is given by
P[~ xi > xj(cj);8j 6= i] = P[~ xi > x(cj);8j 6= i] [by symmetry]
= P[x¡1(~ xi) < x¡1(x(cj));8j 6= i] [x(c) is decreasing]




P[x¡1(~ xi) < cj] [by independence]
= [1 ¡ F(x¡1(~ xi))]k¡1 [by common distribution F]
= Fk
1 (x¡1(~ xi)) [by formula (A.3)]:
(6)
Therefore, contestant i faces the following problem in the ¯rst round:
max
~ x
[W1 + ¦(x¡1(~ xi))]Fk
1 (x¡1(~ xi)) ¡ c~ xi: (7)
An obvious interpretation of the ¯rst-round expected payo® can be seen
from expression (7). W1 is the runner-up prize in the ¯rst round and
¦(x¡1(~ xi)) is the expected value of the opportunity to participate in the
second round. The probability of winning them both in the ¯rst round is
Fk
1 (x¡1(~ xi)), and c~ xi is the cost that has to be paid with probability one in
the all-pay auction environment.
9There is, however, another interpretation of (7). By (A.4) and (A.3), it
can be shown that G ´ 1 ¡ [1 ¡ F]k. Then, the probability in (6) can be
rewritten as
[1 ¡ G(x¡1(~ xi))]t¡1 = [1 ¡ F(x¡1(~ xi))]n¡k
´
[1 ¡ F(x¡1(~ xi))]n¡1







where we use (A.3) again and recall that k = n=t. Denote the pre-revelation
expected payo® in the second round:
z = E[W2(1 ¡ [x¡1(~ xi)=C(1;t¡1)])jC(1;t¡1) > (x¡1(~ xi))]:
The maximization problem (7) can then be rewritten as
max
~ xi
[W1 + ¦(x¡1(~ xi))]Fk














1 (x¡1(~ xi)) + zFn
1 (x¡1(~ xi)) ¡ c~ xi:
(8)
Expression (8) gives an alternative interpretation of the expected payo®: In
the ¯rst round, a contestant wins W1, if he exerts the highest e®ort among
k contestants in his sub-contest, and wins the second-round prize z, if he
exerts the highest e®ort among all n contestants.8
Of course, all the above depends on the existence of a monotonic sym-
metric equilibrium, which we describe in the following proposition.
8This does not mean that the contestant wins the real prize W2 for sure because in the
second-round a mixed strategy is played and there is a positive probability that he loses
even though he exerts the highest e®ort in the ¯rst round.
10Proposition 2. The equilibrium e®ort function in the ¯rst round of the two-













where ¦(s) and ¦0(s) are de¯ned as in (4) and (5) respectively.
Let us sum up. First, we derive the expected value of participating in
the second-round for any-ability contestant. Then, given the expected value,
we ¯nd the optimal ¯rst-round e®ort. Therefore, Lemma 1 and Proposition
2 characterize the monotonic symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of the
two-stage contest with ability revelation.
We devote the rest of this section to the two-stage contest without ability
revelation. A thorough comparison of contests with and without ability
revelation is in the next section.
3.2 No Ability Revelation
When the advancing contestants do not observe the ¯rst-round winners'
abilities, our set-up reduces to the linear-cost case of Moldovanu and Sela
(2006). In their two-stage contest, the advancing contestants update their
beliefs only on the basis that their second-round rivals have all won in the
¯rst round. These updated beliefs tell the ¯nalists that their costs are all
coming from G = F(1;k), but they do not know the exact cost their rivals
posses as they can only infer that a ¯rst-round winner is the one with the
lowest cost among k ¯rst-round contestants. Hence, in the second round the
incomplete information environment is preserved. Let ui : [m;1] ! R+ and
vi : [m;1] ! R+ be contestant i's e®ort functions in the ¯rst and the second
round of the contest respectively. The following proposition characterizes
the equilibrium of the two-stage contest without ability revelation.
Proposition 3. Without ability revelation, the equilibrium of the two-stage
contest is characterized by a pair of e®ort functions, (u;v), where













is the equilibrium e®ort function in the second round.
Note that the maximization problem associated with the no-revelation




1 (u¡1(~ u)) ¡ c~ u:
Comparing this to (7), we can see that they di®er by the \pre-equilibrium"
version of the expected value ¦(x¡1(~ x)). It turns out that, with ability rev-
elation, contestants have extra incentive to exert higher e®ort (given their
ability types) in the ¯rst round.
Proposition 4. The ¯rst-round individual e®ort is higher in a contest with
ability revelation. In particular, x(c) ¸ u(c) for all c 2 [m;1] with strict
inequality except at c = 1. Furthermore, the di®erence is independent of the
¯rst-round prize W1.
If a contest designer can decide whether to reveal abilities after the ¯rst
round, then since x(c) ¡ u(c) is independent of W1 leads to the following
result.
Corollary 1. Suppose that there is a ¯xed amount of total prize ! to be allo-
cated. Then, W1 = 0 and W2 = ! maximize the ¯rst-round e®ort di®erence
between two-stage contests with and without performance revelation.
The fact that the ability revelation contributes to a higher expected e®ort
is only a partial result because we have not considered the e®ect on the
second round. It turns out, as to be shown in the next section, a contrasting
result is obtained for the second round.
124 Comparison of Contests with and without Abil-
ity Revelation
4.1 General Results
In this section, we compare contests with and without ability revelation.
Our main ¯nding is that a contest with ability revelation elicits higher total
e®ort in the ¯rst round. On the other hand, it generates lower total e®ort
in the second round.
Let us ¯rst turn to two lemmas which characterize the stage-wise total
e®ort with and without ability revelation.
Lemma 2. With ability revelation, the ¯rst-round total expected e®ort,
R
(x;y)









































where g(1;2;t) is the joint density of the ¯rst-order and second-order statistics
among t random variables.
Lemma 3. Without ability revelation, the ¯rst-round total expected e®ort,
R
(u;v)


























13The stage-wise comparison of the total expected e®ort gives the following
results.
Proposition 5. The ¯rst-round total expected e®ort is always higher with





A contrasting result is, however, obtained for the second round.
Proposition 6. The second-round total expected e®ort is always lower with





Two numerical examples which conclude our comparisons demonstrate
that the expected total two-round e®ort can be either higher or lower with
the ability revelation.
4.2 Numerical Examples
We consider two numerical examples in this subsection. In both examples
there are n = 4 contestants equally divided into k = 2 groups in the ¯rst
round with t = 2 in each. Contestants' costs, c, are assumed to be drawn
from the interval [0:5;1]. The di®erence between the examples will be on the
primitive distribution function F. We begin with the uniform distribution.
Example 1
Suppose that F(c) = 2c ¡ 1, then
F(c) = F(1;1)(c) = 2c ¡ 1;
G(c) = G(1;1)(c) = F(1;2) = 2(2c ¡ 1) ¡ (2c ¡ 1)2;
G(2;2)(c) = [G(c)]2 = 4(2c ¡ 1)2 ¡ 4(2c ¡ 1)3 + (2c ¡ 1)4;









1 =2:45482W1 + 0:22306W2; R
(u;v)
2 =1:39560W2:
14The stage-wise comparison is consistent with our theoretical prediction.





2 = 2:45482W1 + 1:54755W2;





1 = 2:45482W1 + 1:61866W2:
Therefore, the di®erence is
R(u;v) ¡ R(x;y) = 0:07111W2 > 0:
Hence, as long as the total e®ort is concerned, no ability revelation domi-
nates. The following example gives a contrasting result.
Example 2
Suppose that F(c) = (2c ¡ 1)8, then
F(c) = F(1;1)(c) = (2c ¡ 1)8;
G(c) = G(1;1)(c) = F(1;2) = 2(2c ¡ 1)8 ¡ (2c ¡ 1)16;
G(2;2)(c) = [G(c)]2 = 4(2c ¡ 1)16 ¡ 4(2c ¡ 1)24 + (2c ¡ 1)32;









1 =2:06238W1 + 0:02078W2; R
(u;v)
2 =1:05711W2:





2 = 2:06238W1 + 1:09684W2;





1 = 2:06238W1 + 1:07789W2:
15Therefore, the di®erence is
R(u;v) ¡ R(x;y) = ¡0:01895W2 < 0:
Thus, the total e®ort is higher with ability revelation in this example.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies how ability revelation a®ects the e®ort spending in a two-
stage elimination contest. Our focus has been on a full ability revelation. We
derive the monotonic symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium and show that
the ¯rst-round total expected e®ort is always higher with ability revelation
while the opposite is true for the second-round total expected e®ort. Two
numerical examples demonstrate that the two-round total expected e®ort
can either be higher or lower with ability revelation.
Another open research question that we believe is worth pursuing is to
consider other forms of ability revelation which preserve private information
in the second round. The set of ability revelations under this category
can include one which reveals the rank of the contestants in terms of their
abilities. Another less informative feedback will be the announcement of
some statistics such as the mean or median ability. This kind of ability
revelation has been particularly important in schools where instructors or
teachers reveal the mean or median scores after each test. We believe the
framework here can be extended to study these other forms of information
revelation in contests or tournaments. While the equilibrium derived in this
paper is a separating equilibrium, a less informative revelation may give rise
to a pooling equilibrium.
16Appendix A. Order Statistics
This paper utilizes several results in the theory of order-statistics. Yet, the
conventional notation will be di®erent from those in the auction literature
(e.g., Krishna, 2002). To avoid confusion, we spell out here our notation.
Some useful results in order-statistics will also be included.9
Suppose Y1, Y2,...,Yn are a set of identical and independently distributed
random variables with an underlying distribution function F. We denote
the corresponding order statistics as Y(1;n), Y(2;n),...,Y(n;n) where Y(1;n) is
the ¯rst (lowest) order-statistics among all n random variables.10 The corre-
sponding distribution functions of the order statistics are denoted by F(1;n),
F(2;n),...,F(n;n). These order-statistical distributions F(k;n), k = 1;:::;n relate
















and the corresponding density function is
f(k;n)(y) =
n!
(k ¡ 1)!(n ¡ k)!
[F(y)]k¡1[1 ¡ F(y)]n¡kf(y): (A.2)
We denote Fn
k (y), 1 · k · n, the probability that for a ¯xed value y, there
are k¡1 random variables that are lower than y and there are n¡k random
9Since our paper extends Moldovanu and Sela (2006), to the convenience of the readers,
we adopt similar notations as they do. Note that the order-statistical notations adopted
in contest models of our sort, while di®erent from those in the auction literature, are
standard within statistics itself. For textbook reference on the subject, see, for example,
David and Nagaraja (2003).
10That is, Y(1;n) · Y(2;n) · ::: · Y(n;n). Note that because of this inequality relation,
the order statistics are necessarily dependent in spite of independence of Yi.










(k ¡ 1)!(n ¡ k)!
[F(y)]k¡1[1 ¡ F(y)]n¡k:
(A.3)
The following relation, which follows immediately from the de¯nitions above,
is used frequently in our derivation:
Fn
1 (y) ´ 1 ¡ F(1;n¡1)(y): (A.4)
To interpret (A.4), note that according to our de¯nition, Fn
1 (y) is the proba-
bility that there are n¡1 random variables among n of them that are higher
than y, or equivalently, the probability that y is the lowest among n random
variables. F1;n¡1(y) is the probability that there is at least one of the n¡ 1
random variables that are less than y, and the complement of this event is
exactly the event that is described by Fn
1 (y).
Finally, the joint density of two order statistics, Y(i;n) and Y(j;n), f(i;j;n)(x;y),
where 1 · i < j · n, relates to the primitives in the following way
f(i;j;n)(x;y) =
n!
(i ¡ 1)!(j ¡ 1 ¡ i)!(n ¡ j)!
f(x)f(y)[F(x)]i¡1
£ [F(y) ¡ F(x)]j¡1¡i[1 ¡ F(y)]n¡j:
(A.5)
Appendix B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The probability that a second-round contestant is







= [1 ¡ G(c)]t¡1 ´ Gt
1(c) ´ 1 ¡ G(1;t¡1)(c);
where we use relations (A.3) and (A.4) and i 2 f1;2;:::;tg for the t ¯nalists.
Conditioned on being the highest-ability contestant among all t ¯nalists,
a contestant with a realized cost c has a pre-revelation expected payo® of
E[W2(1 ¡ c=C(1;t¡1))jC(1;t¡1) > c], where C(1;t¡1) is the lowest (¯rst) order-
statistics of the cost of t ¡ 1 remaining contestants. Since C(1;t¡1) is an
18order statistics after the ¯rst-round winners are determined, the primitive
distribution (i.e., the distribution of the unranked costs of the ¯nalists) of

























Multiplying the probability with the conditional expectation, we obtain






















Proof of Proposition 2. The ¯rst-order condition of the maximization prob-
lem (7) is



















Re-arranging terms, we obtain the following di®erential equation
x0(c) =
[W1 + ¦(c)]Fk0




Under the assumption that the equilibrium e®ort function is monotonic, a
contestant with the lowest possible ability (i.e., highest cost) will never win
the contest. His best response is therefore to exert zero e®ort, and this






















19where relation (A.4) is used in the second line.






f(1;k¡1)(c)[W1 + ¦(c)] ¡ ¦0(c)[1 ¡ F(1;k¡1)(c)]
´
:
Hence, x0(c) < 0 if and only if
f(1;k¡1)(c)[W1 + ¦(c)] > ¦0(c)[1 ¡ F(1;k¡1)(c)]:
Since ¦0(c) < 0 while all other terms are positive, the above relation always
holds and hence the e®ort function x(c) is strictly decreasing in c.
Finally, we show that the second-order condition is satis¯ed. Suppose
all but contestant i exert ¯rst-round e®ort according to (9). We will demon-
strate that, for any cost ci contestant i maximizes his expected payo® by
following the same ¯rst-round strategy x(c). Let
¼(~ x;c) = [W1 + ¦(x¡1(~ x))]Fk
1 (x¡1(~ x)) ¡ c~ x (B.2)
be the expected payo® of contestant i with cost c who exerts e®ort ~ x. We
show that the derivative ¼~ x(~ x;c) is non-negative for ~ x < x(c) and non-
positive for ~ x > x(c) which imply ¼(~ x;c) is maximized at ~ x = x(c). Di®er-
entiating (B.2) with respect to ~ x:










Further di®erentiating (B.3) with respect to c gives ¼~ xc(~ x;c) = ¡1 < 0
which means that ¼~ x(~ x;¢) is decreasing in c.
Suppose ~ x < x(c) and denote ~ c to be the cost for which the equilibrium
e®ort is ~ x, i.e., x(~ c) = ~ x. Since x(¢) is a strictly decreasing, this implies
that ~ c > c. Then, ¼~ x(~ x;c) ¸ ¼~ x(~ x;~ c). By de¯nition, x(~ c) = ~ x implies
that ¼~ x(~ x;~ c) = 0. Hence, it follows that for ~ x < x(c), ¼~ x(~ x;c) ¸ 0. By
similar argument, for ~ x > x(c), ¼~ x(~ x;c) · 0. Hence, ¼(~ x;c) is maximized at
~ x = x(c).
20Proof of Proposition 3. Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006) show that



























Substituting (11) into (B.4) and then using (B.5), we have










































Thus, the comparison reduces to the one between the two integrands in (B.6)














since ¦0(s) < 0, and 1=¿ · 1=s for all ¿ 2 [s;1]. Hence, x(c) ¸ u(c) for all
c 2 [m;1].
21Proof of Corollary 1. The result follows immediately from the fact that the
di®erence in ¯rst-round total e®ort with and without ability revelation is
independent of W1.
Proof of Lemma 2. We denote ¯nalist 1 and ¯nalist 2 as in Lemma 1. Note
that the probability distribution associated with ¯nalist 1's mixed strategy,
B1(y), is uniformly distributed on the interval [0;W2=c2]. Hence, his post-
revelation expected e®ort is W2=2c2. Similarly argument is applied to ¯nal-
ist 2. His unconditional post-revelation expected e®ort is c1=c2 £ W2=2c2.











Here, c1 and c2 are the realized values of the ¯rst-order and second-order
statistics from the primitive distribution G of the second round. Hence, the















Note that [1=C(2;t) + C(1;t)=(C(2;t))2] is a function of the ¯rst-order and
second-order statistics C(1;t) and C(2;t), and they are not independent. Thus,
the relevant distribution with which the expectation is formed is the joint




















Using relation (A.5), the joint density g(1;2;t) relates to the primitive distri-
bution G and the density function thereof, g, in the following way:
g(1;2;t)(s;c) = t(t ¡ 1)g(s)g(c)[1 ¡ G(c)]t¡2: (B.9)

































22Proof of Lemma 3. It follows from Moldovanu and Sela (2006).
Proof of Proposition 5. The result follows immediately from Proposition 4.








































Clearly, (c ¡ s) > 0 for all s 2 [m;c) while (c ¡ s) = 0 at s = c. Hence,
Z c
m
(c ¡ s)dG(s) > 0:
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